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The author uses these scenarios to
demonstrate how a U.S. maritime
response to regional aggression could
be constrained or limited by diminished
Navy and Marine Corps force structures
and postures. Thus, these scenarios
examine the potential vulnerabilities
that have resulted from seablindness.
Cropsey recommends that the Trump
administration conduct a comprehensive
assessment of American sea power to determine the “goals, size, and character”
of the U.S. Navy. In two chapters entitled
“Rebuilding American Seapower” and
“Naval Rearmament,” Cropsey’s analysis
frames the naval force structure alternatives facing the Trump administration,
Congress, and naval force planners. The
author evaluates President Trump’s 2016
350-ship campaign goal by comparing
it with the Navy’s 2017 thirty-year
shipbuilding plan of 308 ships and
the 2015 Congressional Budget Office
assessment of Navy shipbuilding.
Cropsey makes recommendations for
changes in force posture, naval operating
concepts, and force structure programming. He determines that the United
States has the industrial capability and
resources to build a 350-ship Navy—if
the Trump administration effectively
advocates for sea power, and if Congress
establishes sea power as a priority.
Seablindness delivers a candid and
uniquely comprehensive examination
of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps
by first assessing the past and current
uses of American sea power and
analyzing force-structure requirements, then considering the future
security environment, naval missions
in general, and particular employment options for the U.S. Navy.
SEAN SULLIVAN
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Neglected Skies: The Demise of British Naval
Power in the Far East, 1922–42, by Angus Britts.
Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017. 253
pages. $34.95.

Although the author describes his
work as a “reconsideration” of the April
1942 clash between the British Eastern
Fleet and the Imperial Japanese Navy’s
Kido Butai (1st Mobile Force), this is
probably something of a stretch. Britts’s
main conclusion—that the neglect
of naval aviation during the interwar
years resulted in a Royal Navy that was
uncompetitive when matched against
the combat-seasoned and well-drilled
multicarrier task force fielded by
Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo—is
hardly earth-shattering. Nor indeed
are his explanations for this lapse:
the obsolescence of both platforms
and thinking in the Royal Navy; and
the almost criminal squandering of
a comprehensive early lead in naval
aviation, a degradation brought about by
parochial infighting within Whitehall,
set against the chronic underfunding
of the navy in particular. To my mind,
to be considered a true reconsideration
a work would have to offer significant
new perspectives, new evidence, or a
novel interpretation of an established set
of events. Unfortunately, and notwithstanding a few fanciful counterfactuals,
Britts does none of these things.
For a start, while the author in his
second and third chapters conducts a
thorough scrutiny of the policy-making
rationale employed and the pitfalls of
that approach, he does not back it up
with a detailed analysis of the detrimental impact the “dual control” system
had on comprehensive development of
naval aviation as a warfare discipline.
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The excessive compartmentalization
and “stovepiping” always were destined
to create difficulties, but in an era when
the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force
were fighting one another for their very
existences, the necessary motivation to
come together was lacking altogether. As
a result, the research and development
necessary to produce aircraft optimized
for warfare at sea never achieved
sufficient priority within a Royal Air
Force primarily dedicated to offensive
bombardment over land. Even more
damaging, the low status of naval pilots
within the service (a point that Britts
does mention) meant that the development of the aerial tactics necessary to
use the air weapon efficiently as an element of sea warfare suffered accordingly.
Similarly, the book almost totally
overlooks the reasons why the Japanese
outclassed everyone (the U.S. Navy
included) when it came to the operation
of multiship carrier groups in 1941, even
though there has been some excellent
scholarship on this subject during the
last couple of decades, most notably
from Jonathan Parshall and Anthony
Tully in their book Shattered Sword
(Potomac Books, 2005). After all, it was
not a matter merely of the technical
competence of the Japanese A6M Zekes
and B5N Kates, as impressive as these
aircraft were. The impact of the planes
was magnified by the techniques the
Japanese had developed for operating
multiple air wings at sea and massing
their effects. Unlike other navies—whose
carriers still operated as individuals,
launching small groups of aircraft of all
disciplines in discrete packages—the
Japanese alone had mastered the art of
role-specializing decks. Carriers within
the group coordinated their launches,
such that half contributed dive-bombers
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to complement the torpedo/level bombers of the other half, thus producing a
large, coordinated force of aircraft in
each wave, while greatly simplifying the
second-strike options (with each carrier’s contribution simply being reversed).
Chapter 5 therefore could have been
enhanced greatly by references to morecontemporary scholarship in this area.
So, with no new exploration of the
operational imbalance between the two
sides, the only real “reconsideration” on
offer is the actual significance (to Great
Britain and its dominions) of Admiral
James Somerville’s decision on April 9,
1942, to preserve his fleet for another
day. While certainly humiliating, this
again was hardly the epoch-making
event that is suggested. The Royal Navy,
in company with many others, both
before and after, arguably simply was
adjusting to the changing realities of
combat experience, as compared with
prewar expectations. It had happened
earlier, during World War I and off
Norway in 1940, and it was going to
happen to the U.S. Navy off Guadalcanal
a few months later. As for the impact
that this had on the perceived vulnerabilities of Australia and India, this is
probably something that is understated
in the other Western accounts and
Britts, as an Australian, is in the right
place to redress this balance. Whether
the Japanese could have followed
through in 1942 is almost immaterial;
the perceptions were probably there.
Finally, although obviously not as
importantly, the book has its fair share
of questionable statements, exaggerations, and even spelling errors, none
of which help its credibility. Perhaps
most notable are the inaccuracies,
which include the alleged “unabated”
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construction of Japanese cruisers
throughout the 1930s (p. 107), when in
fact cruiser construction stopped after
the completion of the Takao class in
1932 and did not resume until 1937. The
“decks filled with aircraft” at Midway
(p. 156) is an assertion Parshall proved
false long ago, while the idea of the “F6F
and TBF being near twins” (p. 163)
makes no sense, given their completely
different roles and specifications. The
exaggerations—such as that Somerville’s
fleet would “not [have been] out of place
at Tsushima” (p. 16), and the reference
to “octogenarian” aircraft (p. 47), when
aviation itself was barely thirty-five
years old—are just unnecessary.
To summarize, this book probably
will disappoint serious historians and
researchers, but nevertheless it does
gather together a host of useful
thoughts about the problems of block
obsolescence and the integration of new
capabilities within a fleet in peacetime.
Given that these points may stimulate
future work or serve to educate the
amateur enthusiast, all is not lost. But
the book could have been so much more.
ANGUS ROSS

Cyber Mercenaries: The State, Hackers, and Power, by Tim Maurer. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge
Univ. Press, 2018. 266 pages. $29.99 (paperback).

The use of proxies as a part of the competition and conflict between states is
an ancient and time-tested method. Yet
from the mercenaries of the pharaoh’s
army in ancient Egypt to private military
and security companies accompanying
militaries in modern conflict, each
relationship between a state and its
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proxies is unique and is driven by a
multitude of factors. In this timely and
well-researched book, Tim Maurer
examines how modern states use cyber
proxies to pursue their geopolitical aims.
The introduction of Maurer’s book is a
deep dive into the evolution of the use
of cyber proxies by states. Unlike many
authors of popular books examining
the use of cyber operations, Maurer
feels no need to sensationalize the cyber
realm. Instead, we get a realistic and
accurate assessment of the capabilities
of cyber proxies. If there is a weakness
to his introduction, it is that he focuses
on traditional “hacking,” or denial-ofservice cyber operations. Although
this approach is quite understandable
and is representative of most scholarly
work on cyber, recent trends suggest a
greater use of algorithmic exploitation
to conduct information-operation
campaigns. These campaigns are unique
in that they do not appear to break
any laws, domestic or international.
Following the introduction, Maurer
proceeds to provide a logical, analytical
framework for categorizing cyber proxies and how states use them. This is no
small task, given the variety of roles and
relationships these groups have vis-à-vis
their respective state organizations.
Maurer organizes the various modes of
proxy use into three main categories: delegation, orchestration, and sanctioning.
Delegation is the proxy relationship in
which the state exerts the greatest degree
of control over its proxy. An example
is the relationship between the U.S.
Defense Department and a contractor
providing a cyber capability. In orchestration, the state may provide limited
logistical support or general guidance
to the proxy, but stops short of issuing
specific instructions. This relationship
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